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Abstract 
 
We hypothesize that the root cause of many goodwill write-offs—managers’ public 
admission of ill-advised corporate acquisitions—is the overpriced shares of buyers at acquisition.  
Overpriced shares provide managers with strong incentives to invest, and particularly to acquire 
businesses, even at excessive prices and doubtful strategic fit, in order to “buy themselves out” 
of the overpriced share predicament and postpone the inevitable price correction by portraying 
continued growth.  We corroborate our hypothesis by documenting:  (1) share overpricing is 
strongly and positively associated with the intensity of corporate acquisitions, (2) share 
overpricing is negatively related to the post-acquisition share performance of buyers, beyond the 
price correction, indicating a negative relation between overpricing and the quality of 
acquisitions, (3) share overpricing is positively related to the size of goodwill write-offs.  We 
further show that share overpricing predicts both goodwill write-offs and their magnitude, and 
that acquisition by overpriced companies is a losing proposition for shareholders.  Finally, we 
document some of the serious private and social consequences of the ill-advised acquisitions 
made by overpriced firms.  These findings contribute to the accounting literature on business 
combinations and goodwill, as well as to the finance/economics research on investor sentiments 
and corporate investment.   
Investor Sentiments, Ill-Advised Acquisitions and Goodwill Impairment 
 
I. Introduction 
The Figure below presents eBay’s cumulative abnormal returns relative to the S&P 500 
index over the last five years.  In mid-September 2005 (see arrow), eBay acquired the Internet 
phone company Skype for $2.6 billion, paid in part by stock.  At the time of acquisition, eBay’s 
stock advanced roughly 100% over the S&P 500, and with the benefit of hindsight—eBay’s 
steep stock price decline in 2006—its shares seem to have been substantially overpriced on 
Skype’s acquisition.  Things soon turned ugly for the online auctioneer, and On October 1, 2007 
it announced a massive goodwill impairment charge (write-off) of $1.43 billion related to the 
Skype acquisition (55% of original price).  Commentators attributed, in part, the soon thereafter 
(January 2008) retirement of Meg Whitman, eBay’s highly respected CEO, to the Skype debacle. 
Figure 1 
eBay vs. S& P 500:  The Skype Acquisition 
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We hypothesize in this study and corroborate empirically that eBay’s chain of events, 
from overpriced shares through large stock-financed but ill-advised acquisitions and ultimately 
to substantial goodwill write-offs is, in fact, a general phenomenon.  We document a strong and 
monotonically positive relation between share overpricing and the intensity of stock-financed 
corporate acquisitions, measured by both the value and frequency of acquisitions (though not 
between overpricing and cash-financed acquisitions), indicating managers’ penchant for using 
overpriced shares to time and finance corporate acquisitions.  We then document an equally 
monotonic and strong but negative relation between share overpricing and the buyers’ post-
acquisition stock returns, indicating that, on average, acquisitions by companies with overpriced 
shares are imprudent (the target is overvalued and/or a strategic misfit for the buyer).  We further 
show that the post-acquisition price reversal goes beyond the correction of the initial overpricing, 
indicating that the acquisitions were, indeed, ill-advised.  Finally, we complete documenting the 
vicious overpricing cycle by showing a strong positive relation between acquisitions financed by 
overpriced shares and the intensity of goodwill write-offs, a public admission by managers of the 
ill-advised nature of the acquisitions.  We further document that overpriced shares predict both 
the occurrence of goodwill write-offs and their magnitude.  
We then turn to an important issue:  When a firm’s shares are overpriced, it is beneficial 
to current shareholders to overpay for a target acquisition, as long as such overpayment is not 
larger than the buyer’s overpricing.  In such case, a subsequent goodwill write-off does not 
necessarily reflect negatively on the acquisition decision.  To determine whether overpayment 
for acquisitions (often leading to goodwill write-offs) are beneficial to the buyers’ shareholders, 
we trace the entire history from overpriced shares, through corporate acquisitions, to goodwill 
write-offs, and document a decrease, on average, in shareholder value.  Thus, shareholders of 
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overpriced firms do not benefit from managers’ attempts to exploit or justify the overpricing of 
their shares.  In this context we also document certain serious social costs of acquisitions with 
overpriced shares.   
 The economics underlying this adverse sequence of events, developed in the next section, 
are essentially as follows.  Overpriced shares provide managers with strong incentives to 
overinvest, and particularly to acquire businesses paid for with the inflated currency (stock).  The 
reasons:  First, an acquisition with inflated shares seems a bargain as long as the acquisition price 
is not equally or more inflated than the buyers’ shares.  Thus, for example, if the buyer’s stock 
price is twice its intrinsic value, an all-stock, fairly priced acquisition means that the buyer gives 
up half the value it gets.  In this case, it may even be rational to overpay for the target in order to 
get the deal done.  Second, overpriced shares, by definition, will drop substantially once investors 
realize they were overly optimistic (often upon the first earnings or sales disappointment).  
Managers obviously strive to postpone as far as possible this day of reckoning, hoping for a 
substantial business improvement down the road that will obviate the price correction.  Some 
managers believe that by acquisitions they will rejuvenate stalling growth, buying their way out 
of the problem (inflated shares).  Others perceive business acquisitions as an effective way of 
obscuring the overpricing (flagging growth) from investors:  The buyer’s sales and EPS (though 
rarely its return-on-equity) increase when the target is combined with the buyer, maintaining the 
growth façade so treasured by investors.  In fact, analysts and consultants often prescribe to 
slow-growth companies a business acquisition strategy to rejuvenate growth.  Third, a business 
acquisition with overpriced shares transfers wealth from new to current shareholders.  Some 
managers favor such wealth transfers as they feel a stronger loyalty to the latter (and, of course, 
to themselves, being shareholders too.)  Thus, overpriced shares provide managers with strong 
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incentives to engage in business acquisitions, and sometimes to overpay or even acquire an ill-
suited target to maintain the growth facade.1 
 The first link of the vicious cycle—from share overpricing to excessive acquisitions—has 
been examined before, both conceptually and empirically (see next section), though we focus on 
a new and important element—that these acquisitions tend to be ill-advised.  Our tests, 
furthermore, are more comprehensive and updated than our predecessors’.  The second link of 
the cycle—from acquisitions financed with inflated shares to goodwill impairment—is to the 
best of our knowledge examined here comprehensively for the first time, as is the prediction of 
goodwill write-offs with overpriced shares.  This is a particularly important link because it 
highlights a major cost, both private and social, of overpriced shares—botched acquisitions, as 
evidenced by the post-acquisitions steep stock price declines and ultimately by managers’ 
admission of large goodwill impairment (recall eBay).  Ill-timed and strategically unfit 
acquisitions are obviously very costly to buyers’ shareholders (we show that buyers’ 
shareholders lose throughout the entire cycle from share overpricing to goodwill write-off), and 
to society as well, in the form of plant closings, laid-off employees and serious diversion of 
managers’ attention to executing acquisitions and desperately attempting to mend imprudent 
ones.  These findings too, are to the best of our knowledge documented first here. 
 We contribute to the accounting literature on business acquisitions and goodwill by 
identifying a major root cause of goodwill impairment—the strong incentives of managers of 
overvalued companies to engage in ill-advised acquisitions (overly paid for and/or strategic 
misfits).  Most studies on goodwill impairment examine: (a) investors’ reaction to the 
impairment announcement—it’s generally negative (e.g., Li et al., 2004), (b) the characteristics 
of target firms related to the write-offs—generally overpaid targets (Li et al., 2004), (c) whether 
                                                 
1 We comment in the next section about the illusionary nature of these incentives. 
4 
 
goodwill impairment is timely or delayed by managers—it’s delayed (Hayn and Hughes, 2006; 
Francis et al., 1996), (d) whether the write-offs improve financial information—they do, write-
offs predict future cash flows and earnings (Anantharaman, 2007), and (e) managerial incentives 
affecting the write-offs—goodwill impairment is related to characteristics of debt contracts, 
managerial bonuses, and exchange delisting regulations (Beatty and Weber, 2006).  While these 
findings are obviously informative, the root causes of goodwill impairment—the circumstances 
under which ill-advised acquisitions are being made—and the ultimate consequences to investors 
and society have not been investigated in the literature. 
 Our findings are also relevant to auditors and regulatory agencies (SEC, for example) in 
the context of ascertaining goodwill impairment (loss of value).  Goodwill (the difference 
between acquisition price and the fair value of the net assets acquired) has to be tested by 
managers annually for impairment, but such test is notoriously difficult.  Unless the target’s 
shares continue to be publicly traded—a small minority of acquisitions—there is no objective 
evidence of impairment.  We document that overpriced shares at the time of acquisition—we 
propose below overpricing proxies—predict goodwill write-offs, and thus provide auditors and 
regulators with information to improve the assessment of goodwill impairment.   
 Our study also contributes to several strands of economics and finance research dealing 
with investors’ sentiments (optimism) and their effects on corporate investment.  In particular, 
while it has been shown that overpriced shares are related to corporate acquisitions, the 
important finding that such acquisitions tend to be ill-advised, as evidenced by large goodwill 
write-offs, is comprehensively documented here for the first time.  Furthermore, and unrelated to 
investors’ sentiments, it has been shown that corporate acquisitions detract from the long-term 
performance of the buyers (i.e., acquisitions have, on average, negative net present value).  We 
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show below that this long-term post-acquisition underperformance can be traced back to 
acquisitions with overpriced shares.  In particular, acquisitions made by fairly-priced buyers do 
not lead to subsequent underperformance of buyers’ shares.  The sweeping statement, often 
heard, that corporate acquisitions are a losing proposition is thus inaccurate. 
 The order of discussion is as follows: Section II briefly discusses various key issues of 
investors’ sentiments, relating our study to extant literature, and outlines our hypotheses, while 
Section III presents the data, summary statistics, and our research methodology.  Section IV 
presents our empirical findings concerning the cycle:  overpriced shares—ill-advised 
acquisitions—goodwill write-offs.  Section V establishes that share overpricing predicts 
goodwill write-offs, and Section VI documents that in the final analysis, acquisitions with 
overpriced shares are a losing proposition. Section VII documents certain private and social costs 
of ill-advised acquisitions, and Section VIII concludes the study. 
 
II. Investors’ Sentiments and Ill-Advised Acquisitions 
 We discuss here various key issues related to investors’ sentiments, overpriced shares and 
corporate acquisition decisions, as well as the extant research related to ours, ending up with our 
hypotheses.   
 
A. Is share mispricing prevalent? 
How prevalent is share mispricing?  Can stock prices in large and active capital markets 
deviate over sustained periods of time from intrinsic values?  No, say ardent believers in capital 
market efficiency.  While individual investors may, of course, over- or under-price securities, 
such mispricing will be quickly identified and offset by sophisticated arbitrageurs in search of 
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gains from mispriced securities, thereby reverting prices to intrinsic values.  Mispricing, goes the 
efficient markets argument, is an isolated, temporary phenomenon.   
This idyllic view of capital markets governed by rational and sophisticated investors is 
increasingly challenged by empirical evidence showing that share prices frequently deviate from 
fundamentals over protracted time periods, sometimes even years (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 
for elaboration).  Cases of widespread, long lasting mispricing—overvaluations as well as 
undervaluations—proliferate.  For example, Eberhart et al. (2004) document that the shares of 
companies with growing R&D (more than 5% annual growth in R&D-to-total assets) yield 
positive and significant risk-adjusted stock returns for up to five years following the R&D 
increase.  Since R&D data are clearly reported to investors in quarterly income statements, the 
fact that these R&D-growth companies generate abnormal future stock returns—almost 20% in 
the first two years—implies that investors systematically undervalue their shares when the R&D 
information is reported, and that it takes several years for the undervaluation to be corrected.  
Moving to overvaluations, starting with Sloan (1996), a large body of research on accounting 
accruals (items comprising the difference between earnings and cash flows, such as depreciation 
or the stock option expense) shows that investors get enamored with companies reporting high 
accruals (their earnings substantially exceed cash flows), despite the fact that in many cases these 
earnings are of low quality (sustainability), as evidenced by the relatively low cash from 
operations of these companies.  The evidence show that investors systematically bid up the stock 
prices of such high accruals companies, only to see these prices plummet over the following two-
three years.2  Lev and Nissim (2006) report that this widespread accruals mirage persisted well 
into the 2000s, a decade after it was first documented, casting serious doubt about the ability and 
willingness of sophisticated investors to quickly eliminate share overpricing. 
                                                 
2 The reverse holds for low accruals companies.   
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The evidence documenting protracted share mispricing is voluminous and growing.  It 
points out that mispricing is particularly prevalent among young and small companies, many of 
whom are scantily followed by analysts (“orphan stocks”) or shunned by institutional investors, 
that is, companies with limited and low quality information.  Companies with hard to value 
assets and prospects, such as intangibles-intensive businesses, are also frequently mispriced, as 
are firms in countries characterized by poor transparency or weak enforcement of securities 
laws.3 
 
B. Where are the Arbitrageurs? 
No one, even ardent believers in rational and efficient capital markets, disputes the 
existence of sentimental investors, optimists or pessimists, or the possibility that otherwise 
rational investors will occasionally act irrationally, like dumping a stock because its price has 
fallen sharply without an informed analysis of the reasons for the price decline or the prospects 
of reversals.4  But, claim mainstream economists, investors’ sentiments will be arbitraged away 
by sophisticated, gain-motivated contrarians, which will quickly restore prices to fundamentals.5  
So, whence the documented systematic and protracted over- and undervalued share cases?  
Where are the arbitrageurs?  The back-to-fundamentals process will, of course, work only if a 
sufficient number of arbitrageurs are able to identify mispriced securities and willing to buy, sell, 
or short them.  Such arbitrage, however, is both costly and risky—one never knows how long it 
will take other investors to realize the mispricing, at which point the arbitrager makes money.  
So, there are serious cost and risk hindrances to effective arbitrage. 
                                                 
3 Baker and Wurgler (2006) point to the difficulty to value shares as the key driver of share mispricing. 
4 Baker and Wurgler (2007, p. 129) define investor sentiment as “a belief about future cash flows and investment 
risks that is not justified by the facts at hand.” 
5 A representative view: “in fact, significant deviations from intrinsic value are rare, and markets usually revert 
rapidly to share prices commensurate with economic fundamentals.”  Goedhart et al. (2005, p. 1). 
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But there is an even more serious limitation to arbitrage of mispriced shares, arising from 
the attributes of the typically mispriced companies.  Consider once more the accruals mispricing.  
Lev and Nissim (2006) document that indeed some active institutional investors do trade on 
accruals, but not in sufficient numbers and capital to eliminate the phenomenon.  The reason: 
High accruals companies are typically small, low profits (or loss-making) and no-dividend 
companies, with volatile stock.  But these are the companies that most well-funded institutional 
investors—the potential arbitrageurs—shy away from, because such companies have low 
liquidity—that is, trading their shares has a large price impact—an obvious concern to 
institutions, and their high stock price volatility is an invitation to unpleasant surprises.6  So here 
is a serious deterrent to mispricing arbitrage:  Companies which are mostly affected by investor 
sentiments—relatively small, young, low-profitability and high volatility enterprises—are those 
that most institutional and sophisticated investors shun.  Share mispricing of such stocks—over- 
or underpricing—often persists for lack of effective contrarians.   
Finally, an important asymmetry, particularly relevant to our study, should be noted.  
Investor optimism, leading to share overpricing is more likely to arise and be sustained than 
pessimism.  Suppose investors A and B differ about the prospects of stock X: Investor A is 
bullish about X whereas B believes it is overpriced.  Both investors don’t own X (or own small 
quantities only).  What will these investors do to put their expectations to work?  Investor A will 
obviously buy X, while all investor B can do is sell it short.  Short sales, however, are for various 
reasons restricted: most individuals (for whom shorting is relatively costly) and many institutions 
                                                 
6 Another reason for institutional reluctance to invest in small, volatile companies is the “prudent-man” law, 
frequently invoked in lawsuits filed by investors seeking damages from fund managers.  Courts often ruled that if 
the defendant invested “prudently,” generally in large, mature, and profitable companies (Wal-Mart, IBM, and 
Exxon come to mind), they cannot be held liable for investment losses, short of fraud (see Del Guercio, 1996).  
Many overpriced companies, such as small high tech and biotech firms, or recent IPOs cannot be considered 
“prudent” investment, and therefore will not be attractive to fund managers. 
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(mutual funds in particular) don’t engage in short sales.  Accordingly, since buying stocks on 
positive views is unconstrained while selling short is, the perceptions of optimism will be 
reflected in stock prices more forcefully and persistently than those of pessimistic investors, 
leading to more pronounced overvaluation of shares even when investors’ opinions about the 
prospects of companies are equally distributed between optimists and pessimists.  Chen et al. 
(2002) provide empirical evidence supporting this scenario.   
 
C. Overpricing and corporate acquisitions 
Several studies document a positive relation between share overpricing and corporate 
investment.  Thus, Polk and Sapienza (2004) argue that when a company’s shares are overpriced, 
managers tend to increase capital investment, financed by cash or debt—not just by equity—to 
convince investors that their elevated growth expectations (optimism) are warranted.  In other 
words, a high investment rate gives the firm an aura of growth.  This hyper-investment by 
overvalued companies is indeed confirmed by Polk and Sapienza’s findings, documenting 
furthermore that these investments are by and large wasteful (negative present value projects), as 
evidenced by the underperformance of the investing firms’ shares subsequent to the investment 
spree, relative to comparable (similar risk and investment opportunities) firms.7  Our main issue 
with this interesting study is that the documented underperformance of the investing companies’ 
shares—the proof that the investments were negative net present value—may be due, partially or 
fully, to the inevitable price correction experienced by overvalued companies.  Polk and 
Sapienza do control for Tobin’s Q and financial slack in their analysis, but these variables may 
not be sufficient controls for the overpricing correction. 
                                                 
7 Stein (1996), and Baker et al. (2003) show that the investment of equity-dependent firms (those with limited 
internal funds and debt capacity) is more sensitive to share mispricing than that of firms that are not liquidity 
constrained.   
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Dong et al. (2006) focus directly on investor misvaluations and corporate acquisitions, a 
dimension we too examine.  The researchers’ main argument should, by now, be familiar:  
Overpriced buyers have an incentive to acquire companies paid by shares, as long as the target is 
less overvalued than the buyer.  Two over-valuation indicators are used by researchers:  the 
price-to-book and the price-to-residual income value (Ohlson, 1995).  The sample period is 
1978-2000.  Dong et al.’s main findings are that, as predicted, buyers have higher valuation 
ratios than targets (i.e., buyers are more overpriced than targets); higher target valuation 
(acquisition price) is associated with a higher probability that equity, rather than cash, is the 
means of payment; and high valuation buyers are more likely to use stock than cash for 
acquisitions’ intensity.  These findings are stronger for the 1990s than the 1980s.  Overall, the 
authors conclude, the evidence is consistent with share overpricing driving acquisitions.  We 
note that this study deals with the first link of our “vicious cycle”—the effect of share 
overpricing on acquisitions’ intensity.  We extend (and update) these findings to examine the 
nature of the investments—ill-advised acquisitions, and their consequences: large goodwill 
write-offs—thereby establishing the high costs, both social and private, or overpriced shares. 
Our study is tangentially related to the examination of long-term post acquisition returns.  
Loughran and Vijh (1997) summarize their findings as follows: “During a five-year period 
following the acquisition, on average, firms that complete stock mergers earn significantly 
negative excess returns of −25.0% whereas firms that complete cash tender offers earn 
significantly positive excess returns of 61.7%.” (p. 1765).  It is an open question whether the 
negative long-term returns of buyers, documented by Loughran and Vijh and others (e.g., 
Moeller et al., 2005), are the result of ill-advised acquisitions, and/or the correction of the share 
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overpricing of many buyers.  We address this issue by distinguishing between the two drivers of 
negative post-acquisition returns—poor acquisitions and overpricing correction.   
Our study is also related to recent work on managers overconfidence (in contrast with 
investors’ excess optimism).  For example, Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that overconfident 
CEOs (identified as those that don’t reduce their personal exposure to company-specific risk, that 
is, hold on to stock options until expiration) overestimate the return on investment projects and 
will therefore invest in negative NPV projects (overinvest).8  So, can our findings be due to 
managers’ overconfidence rather than to investor’s over-optimism?  Unlikely, because 
Malmendier and Tate hypothesize and corroborate that overconfident managers will use internal 
funds, rather than stock, to finance the excessive investment since “…they are reluctant to issue 
new equity because they perceive the stock of their company to be undervalued  by the market.” 
(p. 2662, emphasis ours).9  We, in contrast, focus on acquisition financed by equity.  The source 
of investment funding—cash vs. equity—appears to sharply distinguish between managers’ and 
investors’ optimism. 
 
D. Hypotheses 
Fisher and Merton (1984) argue that managers should take advantage of overpriced 
shares to issue stock and enhance investment, because overpriced shares implies that the firm’s 
effective cost of capital is lower than the intrinsic-value cost of capital (the rational cost of 
capital), and therefore, at such below-rational cost of capital even certain investments with 
negative net present value (assessed at the rational cost of capital) should be accepted.  
                                                 
8 Ben-David et al. (2007) provide similar evidence.   
9 In a subsequent paper (Malmendier et al., 2007) the authors show that overconfident CEOs are significantly less 
likely to issue equity. 
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Following such advice, overvalued firms will overinvest, and even acquire negative NPV 
businesses.  Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H1: The extent of share overpricing will be positively associated with acquisition 
intensity, reflected in both the value and number of corporate acquisitions. 
 We further conjecture that some, perhaps many of the acquisitions made by overpriced 
companies are ill-advised (overly-paid for and/or strategic misfits) because:  (1) Managers of 
overpriced companies know that it is “rational” to overpay for the target (as long as such 
overpayment is lower than the overpricing of their own shares).  But both own share overpricing 
and target business valuation are very uncertain, and some buyers may actually overpay more 
than their shares’ overpricing.  (2) Acquisitions by overpriced companies are often made just to 
keep the “appearance of growth” going.  Such acquisitions are often made in haste and under 
pressure, increasing the likelihood of making mistakes and overpaying for the targets. (3) The 
overpricing of buyers’ shares gives strong incentives to key target employees to sell the shares 
they obtain as soon as possible and switch employment to prevent their newly-acquired wealth 
from evaporating.  (Key employees will generally have certain inside information about buyer’s 
share intrinsic value.)  The defection of key target employees will obviously adversely affect the 
acquisition success.  Accordingly we hypothesize:   
H2: The investments made by overvalued companies will include ill-advised (misfit) 
acquisitions as characterized by: (1) subsequent negative excess returns, and (2) 
large goodwill write-offs. 
 The adverse consequences of acquisitions made by overpriced firms exceed the visible 
effects of goodwill impairment and the associated negative market reaction.  They include 
massive employee layoffs, plant closings and decrease in innovation investment.  Accordingly:   
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H3: The ill-advised acquisitions by overvalued firms cause serious private and social 
harms.   
 
III. Data, Methodology, and Summary Statistics 
We obtained our sample from the SDC database on mergers and acquisitions.  The initial 
sample consists of U.S. publicly traded firms that undertook mergers and acquisitions between 
January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2006.  We include U.S. firms engaged in the acquisitions of 
all types of target firms, regardless of the nationality (both U.S. and foreign) and status (both 
public and private) of the target firms.  We exclude the following observations: (1) the deal was 
unsuccessful, (2) the value of the transaction is not disclosed, (3) the percentage of shares 
acquired in the transaction is less than 90%, and (4) the value of the transaction is more than 
100% or less than 1% of the acquiring firm’s market value.  We also require sample firms to 
have accounting data in COMPUSTAT and stock price and return data in CRSP.   
Our measures of the extent of share overpricing—a key element of this study—are based 
on four firm characteristics:  industry-adjusted price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, the amount of 
discretionary accruals, stock price momentum, and prior equity issuance.  The reason for using 
four overpricing proxies, and our construction of an index reflecting the incremental information 
in each proxy with respect to overpricing, is simple:  there is no single ex ante comprehensive 
measure of share mispricing.10  Accordingly, researchers (Baker and Wurgler 2006; Polk and 
Sapienza 2004) construct indices from several proxies of mispricing, and we follow this 
approach.  Our four proxies are comprised of three measures used by Polk and Sapienza (2004): 
discretionary accruals (Sloan’s 1996 evidence suggests the existence of systematic mispricing 
related to accruals); net equity issuance/repurchases (evidence indicates that equity issues 
                                                 
10 Ex post, overpricing is evident by negative returns, although it’s difficult to isolate the effects of the overpricing 
reversal on subsequent returns from the impact of the firm’s contemporaneous operating performance on returns. 
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(repurchases) predict subsequent low (high) stock returns, namely mispricing, Daniel and 
Titman, 2001); and price momentum  (evidence indicates that yearly excess returns exhibit 
positive serial correlation, that is momentum is a mispricing phenomenon, Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993).  Concerning these three mispricing proxies, Polk and Sapienza (2004, pp. 21-22) 
note: “One problem with the previous two proxies of mispricing [accruals and equity issues] is 
that managers affect discretionary accruals, equity issuance, and investment [the focus of study].  
Our results indicate that there is correlation between investment and both discretionary accruals 
and equity issuance, but they can hardly say anything about the direction of the causality.  While 
high discretionary accruals may cause sub-optimal investment decisions managers may decide to 
manipulate accruals to be able to invest more…  Our next measure of mispricing [price 
momentum] suffers less from the reverse causality problem because it is not directly chosen by 
the manager, and more generally reflects investors’ sentiments.”   
To these three overpricing proxies we add the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, the most 
widespread mispricing proxy used by investors.  Dong et al. (2006) in their study of overpricing 
and corporate acquisitions, use a highly correlated, but somewhat less frequently used measure—
the price-to-book ratio.  The industry-adjusted P/E ratio we use is the difference between the 
firm’s P/E and the industry median P/E ratio for all firms in the sample firm’s 4-digit SIC 
industry.  To assure that the industry median P/E ratio is properly computed, we excluded in its 
computation firms with negative P/E ratios and those with P/E ratios greater than 100.  We also 
exclude in our final sample firms with negative P/E ratios.  Our approach to measuring the 
discretionary component of accounting accruals follows Chan et al. (2001), where discretionary 
accruals are defined as the difference between the firm’s total accruals and “normal accruals,” 
deflated by average total assets.  Total accruals are measured as the difference between earnings 
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before extraordinary items and cash from operations, and normal accruals are a constant 
proportion of the firm’s sales, based on the ratio of the sum of total accruals to the sum of sales 
over the prior five years (year   t–5 to year t–1).  Price momentum is the firm’s market-adjusted 
returns for the 11-month period that ends one month before the firm’s fiscal year-end.  We 
measure equity issuance as the total amount of equities issued by the firm over the most recent 
three years (year t–2 to year t), deflated by lagged total assets. 
We perform a principal component analysis to aggregate and summarize the incremental 
information on firm valuation contained in the four overpricing proxies.  To discern from our 
data the relation among these overpricing proxies to the fullest extent, we include in this 
principal component analysis all available firms, not just buyers, with the required accounting 
and stock return data.  To enhance our estimation of share overpricing we use in the analysis the 
first two principal components, which together account for 53.3% of the total variability.  In our 
subsequent tests and regression analyses, we use these two principal components as the firm-
specific composite indicators of share overpricing (OVE1 and OVE2, respectively). 
We measure the intensity of corporate acquisition activities for each firm-year by the 
total number of transactions undertaken by the firm in the current year (NUM), as well as in the 
next one, and next three years, and similarly by the combined value of all transactions in the 
current year (and subsequent years), deflated by the acquiring firm’s market value at the 
beginning of the year (VALUE).  For firm-years with no mergers and acquisition activities on the 
SDC database, the value of these two variables is set to zero.  We also compute these two 
acquisition intensity measures for the subsamples of transactions that are financed fully by stock 
or by cash.  For each firm-year, we also compute across all transactions the average percentage 
of the transaction value that is paid for by stock (STOCK%).   
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Table 1 provides summary statistics on the firms we study.  Panel A refers to all firms 
with available data, whereas Panel B focuses on acquiring companies.  The data indicate that 
acquirers are larger than non-acquirers (the formers’ median market value is twice the latters’), 
and have a substantially higher industry-adjusted P/E ratio.  As to the four components of the 
overpricing index, acquirers have large discretionary accruals, higher price momentum, more 
equity issued, and a higher relative P/E ratio than non-acquirers.  This is the first indication that 
the shares of acquiring firms, as a group, are more overpriced than those of non-acquiring firms.  
The correlations matrix (Table 2) indicates that our two overvaluation indicators, OVE1 and 
OVE2, are only marginally negatively correlated (–0.063), supporting our use of both indicators 
in the subsequent analysis.11 
 
IV. Empirical Tests 
We essentially employ two methodologies to examine the various hypothesized 
relationships.  The first, a simultaneous classification of the observations by quintiles of the two 
overpricing indicators (principal components) and the second—what else—a regression analysis. 
 
A. Share overpricing and acquisition intensity 
In Table 3, we report our evidence on the association between share overpricing and 
firms’ acquisition over the three years subsequent to overpricing.  Panel A of Table 3 presents 
the mean acquisition value and frequency for the main diagonal of the sample firms classified by 
quintiles of the two overpricing principal component indicators (OVE1 and OVE2).  Thus, for 
example, the left cell (titled Lowest-lowest) includes firms that were classified by each indicator 
among the 20% least overpriced.  The data in each cell indicate mean acquisition intensity—
                                                 
11 The two indicators are, of course, uncorrelated in the sample of all firms from which they are estimated.  In the 
subsample of buyers the two overvaluation indicators are slightly negatively correlated.   
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value and number—in the next three years.  Moving along the diagonal (from left to right across 
each row), the data in Panel A show a strong and monotonic increase in both mean acquisition 
value (divided by market value) and the number of acquisitions (in parentheses).  Thus, for all 
sample firms (first row in Table 3), as one moves from the least to the most overpriced buyers,  
acquisition value (number) increases from 0.067 (0.234) to 0.191 (0.833), namely three-fold.  
The same monotonic increase in acquisition intensity holds for the subsample of acquiring 
companies (second row). 
The next four rows of Table 3 present the quintile data for stock-only and cash-only 
acquisitions, from the least (left) to the most (right) overpriced buyers.  It is clear that the 
increasing trend of acquisition-intensity exists for acquisitions-by-stock only.  For cash-financed 
acquisitions, the acquisition value is roughly flat along the overpricing scale, whereas the 
number of subsequent acquisitions increases monotonically. 
Examining sub-periods (bottom half of Panel A), the tendency of acquisition intensity to 
increase with overpricing is strong in the first two sub-periods, 1990-1995 and 1996-2000, but 
weakens somewhat for acquisition value (though not frequency) in the recent sub-period, 2001-
05.  The reason, perhaps, is that the first couple of years of this sub-period, 2001 and 2002, for 
which we have full subsequent three-year data, were recession years with a lagging capital 
market performance, which generally adversely affect the acquisition activities of firms, 
including that of overpriced companies.12 
Panel B of Table 3 presents estimates of a logistic regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is having (denoted by 1) or not having (denoted by 0) acquisitions in the 
following three years.  In addition to our two composite (principal component) indicators of 
                                                 
12 The data in Panel A refer to the aggregate acquisition activity in the subsequent (to overpricing) three years.  
Performing this analysis on acquisitions in the next year only, yields very similar results.   
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overpricing (OVE1 and OVE2), we include among the independent variables the common control 
variables for corporate acquisitions: firm size (Log(MV)), availability of cash, measured by cash 
flows from operating activities (CFO), the capital market activity indicator (S&P 500 return, 
SP500)—acquisition intensity is positively correlated with the market—and industry dummies.  
The logistic regression estimates indicate that for all acquisitions, the two overpricing 
indicators—our focus of analysis—are positive and statistically significant, for each of the three 
periods examined.  Same applies to stock-financed acquisitions.  For cash-only acquisitions, the 
overpricing indicators are positive and significant, though the magnitude of the coefficients is 
substantially smaller than those of the stock-financed acquisitions.  The pseudo R2s are also 
larger for the stock acquisitions than cash acquisitions. 
Panel C of Table 3 presents OLS regression estimates for the dependent variable—
acquisition value (scaled by total assets).  These regressions are obviously run only on firms with 
acquisitions in the subsequent (to overpricing) three years.13  We note that for all firms with 
acquisitions and for stock-financed acquisitions, the coefficients of the two overpricing 
indicators are positive and significant (except for OVE2 in the next year of stock-financed 
acquisitions).  However, for cash-based acquisitions, practically all the overpricing coefficients 
are insignificant.  Thus, share overpricing is positively related to acquisition value for “all 
acquisitions” and stock-financed acquisitions. 
Summarizing, our tests strongly confirm the hypothesis that acquisition-intensity (value, 
as well as the number of acquisitions) is positively related to the overpricing of the buyers’ 
                                                 
13 The standard errors and t-statistics in this regression are obtained by following the clustering approach prescribed 
by Peterson (2006).  This approach mitigates the effect of cross-sectional correlation in the regression residuals that 
may lead to biased standard errors of coefficient estimates in OLS regression.  It produces unbiased estimates of 
standard errors and hence generates robust inferences about the statistical significance of coefficient estimates. 
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shares.  This relationship is strong for acquisitions financed by shares, and weaker, though still 
present, in cash-financed acquisitions.14 
 
B. Post-Acquisition Stock Returns 
Previous research (e.g., Loughran and Vijh, 1997) indicates that the long-term 
performance of acquiring companies lags the benchmarks.  But this negative performance can be 
due to ill-advised or overpaid acquisitions—the common conclusion of this research—and/or to 
the return reversal of overpriced companies which, as the evidence shows, are particularly active 
in acquisitions.  In this section we distinguish between these factors. 
Table 4 presents the future abnormal returns subsequent to acquisitions made in the years 
following the overpricing measurement.  These returns are computed using the Fama-French 4-
factor model that takes into account the commonly used return-generating factors (market return, 
firm size, book-to-market effect, and momentum).  The results in Panel A confirm extant 
evidence that acquiring firms tend to have below-benchmark returns in the three future years, 
with stock-financed acquisitions performing the worst.  Panel B (main diagonal of the two 
overpricing indicators) shows that for quintiles 1 (lowest overpricing) through 3, the post-
acquisition returns are in fact positive, and monotonically decreasing.  Quintile 1’s acquisitions 
are evidently positive net present value (NPV), on average (coefficient 0.0047, t-value 1.94).  
Things are drastically different for quintile 4 and 5 (medium-high and high-high)—the 40% most 
overpriced firms—where the five-year post-acquisition returns are increasingly negative and 
statistically significant.  This result is very pronounced for stock-financed acquisitions, but not 
for cash-financed acquisitions.  Furthermore, these results also hold for acquisitions made in 
years t+2 and t+3 relative to the overpricing measurement (lower part of Panel B). 
                                                 
14 Polk and Sapienza (2004) argue that overpriced companies will overinvest, using cash or debt, not just stock, in 
order to convince investors that the high price multiples are justified by corporate growth. 
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We conclude from this analysis that while, on average, the long-term post acquisition 
performance of buyers is negative, consistent with prior findings, this negative performance is 
driven by overpriced companies.  The acquisitions made by fairly-priced companies are positive 
NPV, on average.  This still leaves open the important question whether the negative post-
acquisition returns of the overpriced buyers reflect ill-advised acquisitions and/or the 
overvaluation price reversals.  This question is addressed in Table 5, where we compare the 
returns of non-acquiring firms, classified by degree of overpricing, with the post-acquisition 
returns of similarly classified acquiring firms.  This comparison, thus, holds constant the degree 
of overpricing and the subsequent reversal of stock prices due to overpricing, thereby focusing 
on the negative returns due to ill-advised acquisitions.   
The data in Table 5, Panel A show that for quintiles 1-3, the fairly or moderately 
overpriced companies, the 5-year stock performance of non-acquiring companies (top row) is 
quite similar to that of acquiring firms (rows 2 to 3).  However, for quintiles 4-5 (right-side two 
columns), the 40% most overpriced companies, the five-year stock performance of acquiring 
companies is significantly more negative than that of non-acquiring companies.  Thus, for 
example, the post-acquisition returns of the 20% most overpriced firms with two or more 
acquisitions in the current (overpricing measurement) year is –0.0144 vs. –0.0095 for the most 
overpriced firms with no-acquisitions.  The difference between these returns is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level.15  This negative return differential apparently reflects the fact that 
the acquisitions by overpriced buyers were indeed ill-advised—overpaid for and/or strategic 
                                                 
15 As the data in Table 5 show, the extent of overpricing is similar for corresponding quintiles of acquiring and non-
acquiring firms.  In panel A, both the t-test and Wilcoxon z-test fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of mean 
and median values of OVE1 and OVE2 between the corresponding quintiles of acquiring and non-acquiring firms.  
In panel B, the t-test and z-test indicate that the acquiring firms in the highest-highest quintile have significantly 
lower mean and median values of OVE1 and OVE2 than non-acquiring firms in the corresponding quintile (e.g., 
mean (median) of 0.86 (0.50) for OVE1 and mean (median) of 0.18 (0.17) for OVE2 of acquiring firms vs. mean 
(median) of 1.16 (0.73) for OVE1 and mean (median) of 0.42 (0.26) for OVE2 of non-acquiring firms in the highest-
highest quintile).      
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misfits.  This evidence, focusing on the quality of acquisitions by overpriced firms, distinct from 
the overpricing reversal, extends the extant evidence that overpricing leads to excessive 
acquisitions (Dong et al., 2004), as well as clarifies that the documented underperformance of 
acquiring companies (Loughran and Vijh, 1997) is partially due to ill-advised acquisitions made 
by excessively overpriced firms, rather than a consequence of acquisition per se. 
 
 
C. Acquisitions and Goodwill Write-offs 
The final link of the hypothesized vicious cycle—from share overpricing to the 
consequences of ill-advised acquisitions—deals with managers’ admission of the ill-advised 
nature of acquisitions—the decrease (write-down) of goodwill values on buyers’ balance sheets,  
required by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  Table 6 provides the main 
diagonal results, as well as regression analyses relating overpricing during 1991-2000 to 
goodwill write-offs (scaled by buyers’ total assets) during 2001-2006.  For each firm, we 
measure share overpricing by the average value of the two indicators of overpricing (OVE1 and 
OVE2) over 1991-2000.  Goodwill write-offs are based on the total amount of write-offs during 
2001-2006. 
Considering the main diagonal (top row of Panel A), the average goodwill write-off 
increases monotonically with the buyers’ share overpricing:  From 0.0033 (goodwill write-off 
scaled by total assets) for the 20% firms with the lowest overvaluation to 0.0206 (six fold) for the 
20% firms with the highest share overpricing.  The second row shows even more dramatic results 
for the subgroup of firms, all having write-offs in 2001-2206:  The average write-off increases 
from 0.0284 (lowest mispricing) to 0.1012 (highest mispricing).  For firms with acquisitions 
during 1991-2000 and goodwill write-offs in 2001-2006 (fourth row), the diagonal average 
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write-offs increase from 0.0225 to 0.1367.  Thus, the goodwill write-offs of the 20% most 
overpriced buyers amounted to a startling 13.7% of their total assets. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports regression estimates (Tobit and OLS) of the amount of 
goodwill write-off (scaled by total assets) regressed on the two indicators (principal components) 
of share overpricing (OVE1 and OVE2), as well as on the percent of acquisition price paid in 
shares (STOCK%), the buyers’ size (Log(MV)), and industry dummies.  In all the regressions, the 
two overpricing indicators are positive and highly significant (except for OVE2 in the Tobit 
analysis), whereas the stock payment percentage variable is not significant.  This analysis 
confirms the last link of our cycle:  Buyers’ overpriced shares are closely associated with the 
write-off (impairment loss) of the goodwill related to their acquisitions, just as in the eBay 
example that leads this study. 
 
V. Overpricing Predicts Write-offs 
We report in this section on the ability of the overpricing of the shares of buyers to 
predict the subsequent goodwill impairment; both its occurrence and magnitude.  Predicting 
goodwill impairment, that is providing an early warning signal of this adverse event, is of 
obvious interest to investors and auditors, among others. 
We consider each firm-year with acquisitions an observation, and for firms with multiple 
acquisitions in a given year we aggregate their individual firm-year observations into one, 
recording both the number of acquisitions and their value.  We measure the share overpricing of 
buyers, using our two principal component indicators, in the year of acquisition.  We then run 
both a Logit and Tobit analysis; the former with the dependent variable:  goodwill impairment in 
future years (1), and no impairment in future years (0); and the latter (Tobit) with the size of 
impairment in future years (relative to total assets) as the dependent variable.   
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 The independent variables are our two overpricing indicators (OVE1 and OVE2), along 
with (for the first time in our analyses) a variable distinguishing between domestic and foreign 
acquisitions (FOREIGN%), which is defined as the percentage of foreign targets (in terms of 
number of acquisitions) in the firm’s total acquisitions in a given year.  Foreign acquisitions 
differ from domestic ones along institutional, economic, and accounting dimensions, calling for a 
separate analysis.  The remaining independent variables—amount of goodwill, buyer’s size, 
acquisition value, percentage of acquisition price paid in stock, and industry dummies—serve as 
controls. 
 Table 7 reports the Logit and Tobit estimates.  It is evident that in both, the two 
overpricing indicators are positive and highly significant.  The right columns of the Logit and 
Tobit tables indicate that the marginal predictive contribution of the overpricing indicators is 
highest among the independent variable (except for the size of goodwill).  We conclude, 
therefore, that buyers’ share overpricing has a significant predictive ability with respect to 
subsequent goodwill impairment.   
 
VI. Was It All Worth It? 
A question not comprehensively researched in the literature is: What are the implications 
of goodwill write-offs?  Do they signal imprudent acquisition decisions, or perhaps goodwill 
impairment is a benign byproduct of successful market-timing motivated acquisitions?  Indeed, 
managers of goodwill-impaired firms often try to assuage directors and shareholders by claiming 
that in order to get the deal done, they had to overpay for the target (leading to the write-off), but 
that the payment was made with shares which were overvalued more than the target 
overpayment.  In the final analysis, goes the argument, shareholders benefit from the acquisition, 
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even considering the excessive price paid.  According to this scenario, the goodwill write-off is a 
non-event.   
Consider the following comments made by Anthony Muller, the CFO of JDS Uniphase, 
in a 2001 conference call after the firm announced a $44.8 billion goodwill write-off from 
various acquisitions made during the tech bubble of the late 1990s:  “This goodwill resulted from 
our acquiring good companies when valuations were high. But keep in mind that while we 
purchased highly valued shares, we were also in effect selling highly valued shares at the same 
time as none of the transactions resulting in large goodwill amounts were done for cash. Had 
these transactions been done at different times when valuations were lower with exactly the same 
share exchange ratios, the goodwill amounts would have been considerably smaller.” (Pender, 
2001).  So, is goodwill impairment a byproduct of good investment decisions or a consequence 
of poor ones? 
We examine this important question by tracing the fortunes of goodwill-impaired firms 
from acquisition through the goodwill write-off.  We focus on two performance measures:  stock 
market performance and both the return-on-assets (before impairment losses).  Table 8 provides 
the results for both the year-by-year performance around acquisition and write-off, and the entire 
period from acquisition through the write-off.  First thing to note is that of the 504 firms for 
which we have complete data on acquisitions and goodwill write-offs, 100 firms (20%) didn’t 
survive three years after write-off (they were bankrupt or acquired).  Data for the 404 firms that 
made it through the third year after write-off (top panel of Table 8) indicate that both the mean 
and median returns of the full trip (from acquisition through write-off) were decidedly negative:  
–0.32 and –0.43, respectively.  Thus, on the whole, investors didn’t benefit from acquisitions 
paid for by overpriced shares.  The oft-made prescription to enhance acquisitions when share 
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prices are inflated is misguided on both ethical and practical grounds.  The increasingly negative 
mean and median return-on-asset measures in Table 8 corroborate this conclusion.   
 
VII. The Private and Social Costs of Ill-Advised Acquisitions 
We focus in this section on certain preliminary indicators of private and social costs of 
ill-advised acquisitions made by overvalued companies.  First, we document a positive and 
significant association between the size of goodwill write-off and investors’ losses on the public 
announcement of write-offs (this was documented earlier by, e.g., Li et al., 2004).  We also 
document a negative association between goodwill write-offs and the subsequent revisions in 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings, leading to further investor losses (investors generally react to 
revisions in analysts’ forecasts).  More importantly, we then track various indicators of economic 
activity by the write-off companies, before and after the write-off, to suggest social costs.16  
Specifically, we consider the following activity indicators:  sales growth, employment growth, 
physical capital (property, plant & equipment) growth, and R&D growth.  We also consider the 
change in the number of business segments (industries) the goodwill-impaired firm operates in.  
Closing of businesses and plants and the consequent costs to employees and communities will 
generally be indicated by a decrease in the segment number.   
In Table 9 we report investor and analyst reaction to the news of goodwill write-offs.  In 
the examination of investor reaction (Models 1 and 2), we regress the firm’s market-adjusted 
returns over a five-day window, event day –2 to event day +2, relative to the date of quarterly 
earnings and impairment announcement, on unexpected earnings (UXE) and the reported amount 
of goodwill write-offs (WOF).  Unexpected earnings are defined as the difference between actual 
earnings and analyst consensus forecast immediately before the earnings announcement.  UXE 
                                                 
16 Kedia and Philippon (2006) apply a similar methodology to assess social costs of earnings manipulations. 
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and WOF are deflated by the firm’s market value on the date of analyst forecast.  Following 
Petersen (2006), we run the regressions with year dummies and report the significance level of 
coefficient estimate obtained from firm level clustering.  As expected, the regression results of 
Models 1 and 2 indicate a positive and statistically significant coefficient on UXE.  The 
coefficient on WOF in Model 2 is –0.094 (significant at the 0.001 level), indicating a negative 
investor reaction to the news of goodwill write-offs.  The significance of goodwill write-offs is 
also indicated by the improvement in the regression R2 (from 2.35% in Model 1 to 3.95% in 
Model 2).  In Models 3–8, we regress the revision of analyst earnings forecast made after the 
write-off announcement on UXE and WOF.  Consistent with the negative investor reaction to 
goodwill write-offs, analysts also react negatively to goodwill write-offs by revising downward 
the earnings forecast for impairment firms.  The relevance of goodwill write-offs for analyst 
forecast revisions is indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on WOF and the 
considerable increase in the adjusted R2 of the regression when WOF is included.  Thus 
investors’ losses are obviously associated with the size of goodwill write-off. 
In Figure 2 we present the changes in the economic activity indicators before and after 
goodwill write-offs: year-to-year sales growth, employment growth, growth in property, plant, 
and equipment (PP&E), growth in capital expenditure, and growth in R&D expenditures.  To 
avoid the undue influence of outliers, we focus on the median percentage growth rate across 
impairment firms.  We further adjust the various growth rates to the median growth rates in the 
firm’s 3-digit SIC industry in the same year.  Figure 2 (lower panel) indicates that the write-off 
firms had above-industry growth rates in all the indicators examined up to two years before the 
write-offs.  From then on, the growth rates collapse to below-industry median, with all the costs 
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and dislocations (employee layoffs, plant closing, harm to communities) involved.17  The various 
economic indicators tracked increase one year after the write-off, but still lag both the industry 
and the pre-write-off level even three years after the recognition of acquisition losses. 
Figure 3 depicts the mean year-to-year change in the number of business segment for the 
impairment firms, adjusted (lower panel) for the average change in the number of segments 
across all Compustat firms.18  Here too, the write-off companies had above-average segment 
growth prior to the write-off, followed by a sharp decrease in segment growth starting two years 
prior to the write-off.  No recovery after write-off is observed here. 
 
VIII. Concluding Comments 
We hypothesize and empirically corroborate that a major root cause of goodwill write-
offs is the overpriced shares of buyers at time of acquisition.  Share overpricing provides 
managers with strong but distorted incentives to acquire companies—sometimes strategically 
misfit and overpaid for businesses—in order to obscure the overpricing from investors and 
postpone, perhaps even prevent, the day of reckoning (the overpricing reversal).  We document 
that indeed overvalued companies tend to engage in ill-advised acquisitions, culminating in 
goodwill write-offs.  We further show that share overpricing predicts both the occurrence of 
goodwill write-offs and their magnitude.  Regarding the consequences of acquisitions with 
overpriced shares, we show that by and large they are a losing proposition for shareholders, and 
lead to considerable social costs. 
                                                 
17 The fact that the various economic activity indicators turn sharply “south” two years prior to write-off, suggests 
that managers delay the recognition of the loss on acquisitions.  Similar conclusion about write-off delays is reported 
by Hayn and Hughes, 2006. 
18 We also perform this analysis by adjusting for the average change in the number of segments across all firms that 
are from the impairment firm’s three-digit SIC industry and from the same size quintile.  The results of this analysis 
lead to identical conclusion.      
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Sample Firms 
 
Panel A. Distribution statistics of key firm characteristics for all available firms  
  N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25% Median 75% 
Market value (MV) ($ million) 62,992 2974.69 13745   61.53 265.66 1201.29 
Relative P/E 62,992 16.228 115.88 –3.059 0.082 6.913 
Discretionary accruals 62,992 0.013 0.364 –0.026 0.001 0.033 
Price momentum 62,992 0.120 0.721 –0.214 0.009 0.276 
Equity issuance 62,992 0.123 0.517   0.000 0.014 0.089 
Indicator #1 of overpricing (OVE1) 62,992 0.017 1.091 –0.387 –0.191 0.109 
Indicator #2 of overpricing (OVE2) 62,992 0.001 0.739 –0.037 0.038 0.092 
Cash flows from operation (CFO) 54,218 0.110 0.307   0.052 0.099 0.161 
Panel B. Distribution statistics of key firm characteristics for firms with acquisition activities 
  N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 25% Median 75% 
Market value (MV) ($ million) 9,725 3420.07 14058 149.62 535.00 1793.58 
Relative P/E 9,725 21.447 144.69 –2.061 0.964 8.793 
Discretionary accruals 9,725 0.018 0.256 –0.019 0.002 0.032 
Price momentum 9,725 0.124 0.748 –0.205 0.020 0.277 
Equity issuance 9,725 0.185 0.433   0.002 0.036 0.203 
Indicator #1 of overpricing (OVE1) 9,725 0.124 1.176 –0.348 –0.134 0.217 
Indicator #2 of overpricing (OVE2) 9,725 –0.015 0.692 –0.035 0.036 0.083 
Cash flows from operation (CFO) 8,260 0.116 0.135   0.059 0.108 0.169 
Number of acquisitions (NUM) 9,725 1.399 0.966   1.000 1.000 2.000 
Value of acquisitions (VALUE) 9,725 0.334 0.916   0.053 0.138 0.349 
Percentage of stock offered (STOCK%) 9,725 0.275 0.397   0.000 0.000 0.528 
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Variable definitions are as follows.  Market value (MV) (in $ millions) is the firm’s capital 
market valuation of common equity at the fiscal year-end.  Relative P/E is the difference between 
the firm’s P/E ratio and the 4-digit SIC industry median P/E ratio for all firms in the sample 
firm’s 4-digit SIC industry.  In the computation of 4-digit industry median P/E ratio, we exclude 
firms with negative P/E ratios and firms with P/E ratios greater than 100.  Firms with negative 
P/E ratios are excluded in the sample.  Discretionary accruals are the difference between the 
firm’s total accruals and “normal accruals,” deflated by average total assets.  Total accruals are 
measured as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and cash from operation, 
and normal accruals are a constant proportion of the firm’s current year sales, based on the ratio 
of the sum of total accruals to the sum of sales over the prior five years (year t–5 to year t–1) 
(Chan et al., 2001).   Price momentum is the firm’s market-adjusted returns for the 11-month 
period that ends one month before the firm’s fiscal year-end.  Equity issuance is the total amount 
of equities issued by the firm over the most recent three years (year t–2 to year t), deflated by 
lagged total assets.  Indicator #1 of overpricing (OVE1) and indicator #2 of overpricing (OVE2) 
are, respectively, the first and second principal component of the firm’s relative P/E, 
discretionary accruals, price momentum, and equity issuance.  Cash flows from operation (CFO) 
is the amount of net cash flows from the firm’s operating activities, deflated by lagged total 
assets.  The number of acquisitions (NUM) is the total number of acquisition transactions 
undertaken by the firm in the current year.  The value of acquisitions (VALUE) is the combined 
value of all acquisition transactions in the current year, deflated by the acquiring firm’s market 
value at the beginning of the year.  The percentage of stock offered (STOCK%) is the average 
percentage of the transaction value paid for by stock across all transactions in the year.    
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Table 2 
Pearson (Upper Diagonal) and Spearman (Lower Diagonal) Correlation Coefficient Among Key Variables  
for Firms with Acquisition Activities (p-value for two-sided significance test in parenthesis)  
 
  Log(MV) OVE1 OVE2 CFO NUM VALUE STOCK% 
Logarithm of market value (Log(MV)) 1.000 –0.005 –0.052 0.163 0.075 –0.122 0.069 
  (0.590) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Indicator #1 of overpricing (OVE1)  –0.020 1.000 –0.182 0.061 0.087 0.152 0.064 
 (0.044)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Indicator #2 of overpricing (OVE2) –0.045 –0.063 1.000 –0.072 –0.035 0.015 –0.018 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.136) (0.078) 
Cash flows from operation (CFO) 0.188 0.054 –0.216 1.000 –0.008 0.111 0.035 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.477) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of acquisitions (NUM) 0.101 0.096 –0.033 –0.011 1.000 0.126 0.009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.332)  (0.001) (0.369) 
Value of acquisitions (VALUE) –0.263 0.120 0.018 –0.052 0.267 1.000 0.060 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.068) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Percentage of stock offered (STOCK%) 0.040 0.028 –0.017 0.019 0.093 0.164 1.000 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.100) (0.090) (0.001) (0.001)  
 
 
This table gives the Pearson (in the upper diagonal) and Spearman (in the lower diagonal) correlation coefficients among key 
variables for firms with acquisition activities.  Variable definitions are given in the footnote to Table 1.
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Table 3 
The Relation between Share Overpricing and Subsequent Acquisition Activities 
 
Panel A. Mean value (frequency) of acquisitions over the subsequent three years  
Main diagonal of sample firms classified by quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 
Sample 
Form of 
payment 
Lowest-      
lowest 
Low-         
medium 
Medium-
medium 
Medium-      
high 
Highest-       
highest 
All firms All 0.067 0.082 0.110 0.133 0.191 
(0.234) (0.364) (0.565) (0.777) (0.833)
Acquirers All 0.316 0.318 0.324 0.363 0.574 
(1.549) (1.611) (1.834) (2.116) (2.508)
All firms Stock 0.010 0.017 0.031 0.047 0.057 
(0.021) (0.059) (0.157) (0.244) (0.223)
Acquirers Stock 0.342 0.366 0.374 0.395 0.542 
(1.167) (1.283) (1.545) (1.804) (2.129)
All firms Cash 0.015 0.02 0.023 0.020 0.023 
(0.082) (0.123) (0.166) (0.183) (0.189)
Acquirers Cash 0.238 0.215 0.174 0.158 0.183 
(1.279) (1.324) (1.272) (1.421) (1.519)
1990-1995 All 0.097 0.101 0.111 0.193 0.259 
(0.338) (0.440) (0.636) (1.043) (0.908)
1996-2000 All 0.061 0.104 0.122 0.149 0.241 
(0.227) (0.415) (0.639) (0.867) (1.081)
2001-2005 All 0.049 0.044 0.068 0.069 0.081 
(0.161) (0.248) (0.423) (0.466) (0.523)
1990-1995 Stock 0.009 0.031 0.052 0.092 0.094 
(0.025) (0.106) (0.273) (0.479) (0.283)
1996-2000 Stock 0.01 0.016 0.037 0.046 0.073 
(0.030) (0.055) (0.182) (0.251) (0.360)
2001-2005 Stock 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.011 0.008 
(0.011) (0.021) (0.017) (0.039) (0.036)
1990-1995 Cash 0.023 0.031 0.021 0.019 0.031 
(0.098) (0.145) (0.161) (0.217) (0.221)
1996-2000 Cash 0.007 0.019 0.028 0.029 0.022 
(0.054) (0.123) (0.169) (0.199) (0.188)
2001-2005 Cash 0.015 0.011 0.019 0.012 0.017 
(0.090) (0.104) (0.167) (0.139) (0.161)
 
Table 3 (Continued) 
The Relation between Share Overpricing and Subsequent Acquisition Activities 
 
Panel B. Results from logistic regression of acquisitions over the subsequent three years on indicators of overpricing and control variables 
 All acquisitions  Stock-only acquisitions  Cash-only acquisitions 
Variable 
All  
years 
1990-      
-1995 
1996-     
-2000 
2001-      
-2005   
All  
years 
1990-      
-1995 
1996-      
-2000 
2001-      
-2005   
All  
years 
1990-      
-1995 
1996-      
-2000 
2001-      
-2005 
Intercept -1.928 -2.107 -2.109 -2.061  -4.427 -3.979 -5.382 -5.312  -3.334 -3.813 -3.249 -3.295 
[p-value] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
OVE1 0.252 0.194 0.229 0.224  0.513 0.403 0.423 0.399  0.158 0.121 0.117 0.149 
 [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001]  [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001]  [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
OVE2 0.124 0.101 0.194 0.254  0.138 0.172 0.240 0.126  0.101 0.052 0.115 0.245 
 [< 0.001] [0.035] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [0.001] [0.022] [0.005] [0.198] [0.002] [0.276] [0.063] [0.066] 
Log(MV) 0.120 0.171 0.174 0.091  0.146 0.185 0.282 0.115  0.171 0.240 0.175 0.139 
 [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [0.002] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
CFO 1.175 1.254 1.076 1.289  1.635 2.076 1.859 -0.027  1.362 1.108 1.102 1.795 
 [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [0.486] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
SP500 0.436 0.455 0.633 -1.535  1.968 0.171 2.592 -2.442  0.015 0.684 0.315 -1.500 
 [< 0.001] [0.002] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [0.271] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [0.442] [< 0.001] [0.066] [< 0.001] 
Industry 
dummies Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 6.05% 6.40% 6.82% 4.21%  7.89% 6.91% 11.78% 4.54%  6.43% 7.73% 5.39% 4.44% 
Likelihood 1135.66 602.59 646.83 386.03  747.55 364.09 576.91 177.06  897.82 495.35 374.25 307.57 
Ratio [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001]  [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001]  [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
N 40,513 13,407 13,069 14,037  40,513 13,407 13,069 14,037  40,513 13,407 13,069 14,037 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
The Relation between Share Overpricing and Subsequent Acquisition Activities 
 
Panel C. Results from OLS regression of total acquisition value over the subsequent three 
years on indicators of overpricing and control variables 
Variable 
All  
acquisitions 
Stock-only  
acquisitions 
Cash-only 
acquisitions 
Intercept 0.625  0.595 0.556 
(t-statistics) (26.46) (9.59) (13.29) 
[p-value] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
    
OVE1 0.034 0.030 –0.007 
 (4.59) (1.91) (–0.91) 
 [< 0.001] [0.028] [0.181] 
    
OVE2 0.043 0.057 –0.028 
 (3.33) (2.18) (–1.31) 
 [< 0.001] [0.015] [0.101] 
    
Log(MV) –0.045 –0.037 –0.052 
 (–13.83) (–4.30) (–10.11) 
 [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
    
CFO –0.172 –0.173 –0.165 
 (–3.12) (–1.51) (–2.28) 
 [0.001] [0.066] [< 0.001] 
    
SP500 0.123 –0.114 0.055 
 (5.07) (–1.46) (2.10) 
 [< 0.001] [0.072] [0.018] 
    
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
    
Adjusted R2 8.11% 9.66% 11.27% 
    
F-statistics 18.26 5.52 5.91 
[p-value] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
    
N 10,548 1,853 4,351 
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In panel A, the main diagonal of sample firms classified by quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 are 
formed by assigning firms in each year into quintile portfolios ranked by the values of OVE1 
and OVE2, respectively, and then retaining firms in the intersection of the two portfolios.  For 
example, the portfolio labeled “Highest-highest” (“Lowest-lowest”) consists of firms that are 
in the top (bottom) quintiles ranked by both OVE1 and OVE2.  “All firms” include all firms 
with data on OVE1 and OVE2, and “Acquirers” include only those with acquisition activities.  
“Stock” includes firms with acquisitions that are completely paid with the shares of the 
acquiring firm, and “Cash” includes firms with acquisitions that are fully paid with cash.  The 
definitions of OVE1, OVE2, MV, and CFO are as given in the footnote to Table 1.  The logistic 
regressions in panel B include the decision of acquisition (1 for acquiring firms and 0 for non-
acquiring firms) as the dependent variable.  The standard error estimates in the OLS 
regressions of panel C are obtained by following the firm-level clustering procedure of 
Peterson (2006).    
Table 4 
Future Five-Year Stock Performance (Post-Acquisition) of Firms with Acquisition Activities 
 
Panel A.  Estimate of future abnormal returns for all acquisitions, stock-only acquisitions, and cash-only acquisitions 
Acquisition type Acquisition year Estimate t-statistic p-value 
All acquisitions t + 1 –0.0024 –2.35 0.010 
Stock-only acquisitions t + 1 –0.0045 –2.41 0.008 
Cash-only acquisitions t + 1   0.0005  0.24 0.406 
All acquisitions t + 2 –0.0028 –2.78 0.003 
Stock-only acquisitions t + 2 –0.0036 –2.76 0.003 
Cash-only acquisitions t + 2 –0.0028 –1.87 0.032 
All acquisitions t + 3 –0.0021 –1.91 0.029 
Stock-only acquisitions t + 3 –0.0032 –2.37 0.009 
Cash-only acquisitions t + 3 –0.0013 –0.79 0.214 
Panel B.  Estimate of future abnormal returns for sub-sample partitioned by quintiles of overpricing (OVE1 and OVE2) 
Main diagonal of sample firms classified by quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 
Acquisition type (year) 
Lowest- 
lowest 
Low- 
medium  
Medium-
medium 
Medium- 
high  
Highest- 
highest 
All acquisitions (t+1) 0.0047 0.0003 0.0001 –0.0052 –0.0103 
(t-statistics) (1.94) (0.18) (0.04) (–2.34) (–5.31) 
[p-value] [0.027] [0.430] [0.484] [0.010] [< 0.001] 
Stock-only acquisitions (t+1) 0.0027 0.0002 0.0002 –0.0054 –0.0127 
(0.70) (0.08) (0.07) (–1.58) (–4.15) 
[0.242] [0.467] [0.474] [0.058] [< 0.001] 
Cash-only acquisitions (t+1) 0.0007 0.0009 –0.0003 –0.0004 –0.0047 
(0.19) (0.59) (–0.11) (–0.19) (–1.72) 
[0.424] [0.276] [0.455] [0.426] [0.044] 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Future Five-Year Stock Performance (Post-Acquisition) of Firms with Acquisition Activities 
 
Panel B.  Estimate of future abnormal returns for sub-sample partitioned by quintiles of overpricing (cont.) 
 Main diagonal of sample firms classified by quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 
Acquisition type (year) 
Lowest- 
lowest 
Low- 
medium 
Medium- 
medium 
Medium- 
high 
Highest- 
highest 
All Acquisitions (t+2) 0.0044 0.0012 0.0011 –0.0050 –0.0081 
(t-statistics) (2.39) (0.44) (0.63) (–2.22) (–4.03) 
[p-value] [0.009] [0.329] [0.263] [0.014] [< 0.001] 
      
Stock-only acquisitions (t+2) 0.0043 0.0004 –0.0010 –0.0064 –0.0122 
 (1.05) (0.12) (–0.46) (–2.17) (–3.22) 
 [0.148] [0.453] [0.324] [0.016] [0.001] 
      
Cash-only acquisitions (t+2) 0.0028 0.0026 0.0008 –0.0034 –0.0069 
 (1.37) (1.29) [0.33] (–0.88) (–2.18) 
 [0.087] [0.100] [0.370] [0.190] [0.015] 
 
All Acquisitions (t+3) 0.0064 0.0017 –0.0007 –0.0039 –0.0071 
 (2.31) (0.58) (–0.33) (–1.52) (–3.81) 
 [0.011] [0.282] [0.369] [0.066] [< 0.001] 
      
Stock-only acquisitions (t+3) 0.0011 0.0005 –0.0015 –0.0029 –0.0052 
 (0.21) (0.20) (–0.61) (–1.05) (–1.71) 
 [0.417] [0.420] [0.271] [0.148] [0.045] 
      
Cash-only acquisitions (t+3) 0.0064 0.0004 –0.0025 0.0040 –0.0072 
 (1.54) (0.19) (–1.14) (–0.97) (–2.24) 
 [0.063] [0.425] [0.128] [0.166] [0.013] 
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Future abnormal returns reported in this table (panels A and B) are the intercept of the monthly Fama-French four-factor model that 
accounts for the effect of market return, firm size, book-to-market, and return momentum.  This model is estimated on portfolios 
consisting of firms with acquisition activities one year (t+1), two years (t+2), and three years (t+3) after the measurement of share 
over-pricing (i.e., the measurement date of OVE1 and OVE2), respectively.  Firms are included into the portfolio from the month after 
the acquisition and remain in the portfolio for 60 months (5 years).  The procedure for assigning firms into the main diagonal 
portfolios classified by the quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 is given in the footnote to Table 3. 
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Table 5 
The Relation between Acquisition Activities and Future Five-Year Stock Performance 
 
 Main diagonal of sample firms classified by quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 
Sample 
Lowest-
lowest 
Low-
medium 
Medium-
medium 
Medium-
high  
Highest-
highest 
Panel A. Classification based on acquisitions in current year (year t)    
(A1) Firms with NO acquisitions in year t      
Average monthly abnormal return over 5-year period 0.0068 0.0026 0.0016 –0.0039 –0.0095 
(t-statistics) (4.51) (2.24) (1.37) (–3.22) (–6.78) 
[p-value] [< 0.001] [0.013] [0.086] [0.001] [< 0.001] 
Mean OVE1, mean OVE2 –0.60, –0.26 –0.34, –0.02 –0.20, 0.03 0.03, 0.08 1.16, 0.42 
[Median OVE1, median OVE2] [–0.56, –0.14] [–0.34, –0.01] [–0.19, 0.04] [0.02, 0.08] [0.73, 0.25] 
      
(A2) Firms with one or more acquisitions in year t      
Average monthly abnormal return over 5-year period 0.0069 0.0021 0.0004 –0.0047 –0.0129 
(t-statistics) (3.56) (0.99) (0.27) (–2.23) (–5.67) 
[p-value] [< 0.001] [0.163] [0.393] [0.014] [< 0.001] 
Mean OVE1, mean OVE2 –0.58, –0.20 –0.35, –0.01 –0.21, 0.04 0.03, 0.08 1.24, 0.50 
[Median OVE1, median OVE2] [–0.56, –0.13] [–0.34, –0.01] [–0.21, 0.04] [0.02, 0.08] [0.74, 0.24] 
      
(A3) Firms with two or more acquisitions in year t      
Average monthly abnormal return over 5-year period 0.0041 0.0023 0.0007 –0.0059 –0.0144 
(t-statistics) (1.50) (1.14) (0.37) (–1.74) (–3.76) 
[p-value] [0.068] [0.127] [0.378] [0.042] [< 0.001] 
Mean OVE1, mean OVE2 –0.60, –0.16 –0.37, –0.01 –0.22, 0.04 0.02, 0.08 1.26, 0.51 
[Median OVE1, median OVE2] [–0.61, –0.13] [–0.35, –0.01] [–0.22, 0.04] [0.01, 0.07] [0.76, 0.24] 
      
Difference between firms in (A3) and firms in (A1)      
Difference in average monthly abnormal return –0.0027 –0.0003  –0.0009 –0.0020 –0.0049 
(t-statistics) (–1.41) (–0.46) (–1.09) (–1.45) (–2.53) 
[p-value] [0.081] [0.341] [0.139] [0.075] [0.006] 
Difference in mean OVE1, difference in mean OVE2 0.00, 0.10 –0.03, 0.01 –0.02, 0.01  –0.01, 0.00 0.10, 0.09 
[Difference in median OVE1, difference in median OVE2] [–0.05, 0.01] [–0.01, 0.00] [–0.03, 0.00] [–0.01, –0.01] [0.03, –0.01] 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
The Relation between Acquisition Activities and Future Five-Year Stock Performance 
 
 Main diagonal of sample firms classified by quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 
Sample 
Lowest-
lowest 
Low-
medium 
Medium-
medium 
Medium-
high  
Highest-
highest 
Panel B. Classification based on acquisitions in prior years (t–4 to t–1), current year (t), and future years (t+1 to t+3) 
(B1) Firms with NO acquisition in years t–4, t-3, t–2, t –1, and t (5-year span)    
Average monthly abnormal return over 5-year period 0.0072 0.0029 0.0017 –0.0040 –0.0099 
(t-statistics) (4.60) (2.56) (1.50) (–3.24) (–6.96) 
[p-value] [< 0.001] [0.006] [0.067] [0.001] [< 0.001] 
Mean OVE1, mean OVE2 –0.61, –0.29 –0.35, –0.02 –0.20, 0.03 0.03, 0.08 1.16, 0.42 
[Median OVE1, median OVE2] [–0.57, –0.15] [–0.34, –0.01] [–0.20, 0.04] [0.02, 0.08] [0.73, 0.26] 
      
(B2) Firms with NO acquisition in years t–3, t–2, t–1, t, t+1, t+2 and t+3 (7-year span)    
Average monthly abnormal return over 5-year period 0.0073 0.0030 0.0017 –0.0040 –0.0106 
(t-statistics) (4.69) (2.54) (1.50) (–3.10) (–7.61) 
[p-value] [< 0.001] [0.006] [0.067] [0.001] [< 0.001] 
Mean OVE1, mean OVE2 –0.61, –0.30 –0.35, –0.02 –0.20, 0.03 0.03, 0.08 1.15, 0.42 
[Median OVE1, median OVE2] [–0.56, –0.15] [–0.34, –0.01] [–0.20, 0.04] [0.02, 0.08] [0.71, 0.26] 
      
(B3) Firms with acquisitions every year in years t–2, t–1, t, t+1, and t+2 (5-year span)    
Average monthly abnormal return over 5-year period 0.0055 0.0039 0.0011 –0.0128 –0.0158 
(t-statistics) (1.07) (1.40) (0.46) (–2.21) (–2.90) 
[p-value] [0.144] (0.081) [0.323] [0.015] [0.002] 
Mean OVE1, mean OVE2 –0.52, –0.09 –0.29, –0.01 –0.20, 0.04 0.02, 0.07 0.86, 0.18 
[Median OVE1, median OVE2] [–0.51, –0.09] [–0.28, –0.02] [–0.19, 0.05] [0.04, 0.07] [0.50, 0.17] 
      
Difference between firms in (B3) and firms in (B1)      
Difference in average monthly abnormal return –0.0017 –0.0010 –0.0006 –0.0088  –0.0059  
(t-statistics) (–0.90) (–0.94) (–0.87) (–1.96) (–1.93) 
[p-value] [0.185] [0.174] [0.193] [0.026] [0.028] 
Difference in mean OVE1, difference in mean OVE2 0.09, 0.29 0.06, 0.01 0.00, 0.01 –0.01, –0.01 –0.30, –0.24 
[Difference in median OVE1, difference in median OVE2] [0.06, 0.06] [0.06, –0.01] [0.01, 0.01] [0.02, –0.01] [–0.23, –0.09] 
 
 
 
Future abnormal returns reported in this table (panels A and B) are the intercept of the monthly Fama-French four-factor model that 
accounts for the effect of market return, firm size, book-to-market, and return momentum.  This model is estimated on portfolios 
consisting of firms with acquisition activities in the current year (year t), the year for which share overpricing is measured (i.e., the 
measurement year of OVE1 and OVE2), as well as years before and after the acquisition.  Firms are included into the portfolio from 
the month after the acquisition and remain in the portfolio for 60 months (5 years).  The procedure for assigning firms into the main 
diagonal portfolios classified by the quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 is given in the footnote to Table 3. 
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Table 6 
The Relation between Share Overpricing/Acquisition and Goodwill Impairment Write-off in Subsequent Years 
 
 
Panel A. Mean amount of goodwill impairment write-offs in 2001-2006 for portfolios formed by indicators of overpricing 
 Main diagonal of sample firms classified by quintiles of OVE1 and OVE2 
Sample 
Lowest-
lowest 
Low-
medium  
Medium-
medium 
Medium-
high 
Highest-
highest 
1) All firms with data on over-valuation errors 0.0033 0.0051 0.0060 0.0118 0.0206 
      
2) Firms with non-zero impairment over 2001-2006 0.0284 0.0289 0.0424 0.0757 0.1012 
      
3) Firms with acquisitions activities over 1991-2000 0.0032 0.0060 0.0111 0.0212 0.0338 
      
4) Firms with acquisitions activities over 1991-2000 0.0225 0.0270 0.0603 0.1046 0.1367 
     and non-zero impairment over 2001-2006      
            
 
44 
 
Table 6 (Continued) 
The Relation between Share Overpricing/Acquisition and Goodwill Impairment  
Write-off in Subsequent Years 
 
Panel B. Regression of future goodwill impairment write-off on indicators of 
overpricing, acquisition means, and control variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sample (regression type) 
All firms      
(Tobit) 
Firms with 
impairment 
(OLS) 
Firms with 
acquisition 
(Tobit) 
Firms with 
acquisition and 
impairment 
(OLS) 
Intercept –0.2581 0.0778 –0.2146 0.0652 
(t-statistics) (–20.34) (7.89) (–12.61) (4.39) 
[p-value] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
     
OVE1 0.0080 0.0309 0.0173 0.0264 
 (2.39) (7.00) (4.53) (6.69) 
 [0.009] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] [< 0.001] 
     
OVE2 0.0046 0.0336 0.0177 0.0257 
 (0.67) (4.08) (2.31) (3.45) 
 [0.251] [< 0.001] [0.011] [< 0.001] 
     
STOCK% ——— ——— 0.0045 0.0035 
   (0.34) (0.24) 
   [0.367] [0.404] 
     
Log(MV) 0.0132 –0.0041 0.0102 –0.0024 
 (8.32) (–2.68) (4.58) (–1.11) 
 [< 0.001] [0.004] [< 0.001] [0.134] 
     
3-digit SIC Industry 
Dummies Included Included Included Included 
     
F-statistics ——— 16.29 ——— 10.92 
[p-value]  [< 0.0001]  [< 0.0001] 
     
Log likelihood –886.09 ——— –371.21 ——— 
Chi-square 175.19  115.39  
[p-value] [< 0.0001]  [< 0.0001]  
     
Pseudo R2 [Adjusted R2] 9.00% [15.06%] 13.45% [19.26%] 
N 4,849 777 2,136 417 
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For each firm, we measure share overpricing by the average value of the two indicators of 
overpricing (OVE1 and OVE2) over 1990-2000.  Goodwill write-offs are based on the total 
amount of write-offs during 2001-2006.  The procedure for assigning firms into the main diagonal 
portfolios classified by the quintiles of average OVE1 and OVE2 is similar to the one given in the 
footnote to Table 3, with the definitions of OVE1 and OVE2 for a firm-year given in the footnote 
to Table 1.  STOCK% is the average percentage of acquisition paid with stock across all 
acquisitions over 1990-2000.  The sample for “All firms” in Model 1 includes all available firms 
with data on OVE1 and OVE2.  The sample for “Firms with impairment” in Model 2 includes 
firms that report goodwill impairment during 2001-2006 and have data on OVE1 and OVE2 over 
prior years.  The sample for “Firms with acquisition” includes firms with acquisitions over 1990-
2000 and with data on OVE1 and OVE2.  The sample for “Firms with acquisition and 
impairment” in Model 4 includes all firms in the regressions of Model 3 and Model 4 (i.e., firms 
that have acquisitions over 1990-200 and report impairment over 2001-2006).   
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Table 7 
The Usefulness of Share Overpricing/Acquisition in Predicting  
Goodwill Impairment in Future Years 
 
Panel A. Logistic regression predicting impairment vs. no-impairment  
Independent variable 
Coefficient 
estimate z-statistics p-value 
Effect on 
probability
Intercept –0.769 –11.58 < 0.001 ——— 
OVE1   0.778   8.81 < 0.001 19.33% 
OVE2   0.587   3.10    0.001 14.97% 
STOCK%   0.013 11.47 < 0.001   0.32% 
Log(NUM)   0.205   2.08    0.019   5.12% 
VALUE –0.141 –1.92    0.028 –3.53% 
FOREIGN%   0.167   1.58    0.058   4.18% 
GOODWILL   1.642   9.20 < 0.001 41.01% 
Log(MV) –0.032 –1.61    0.054 –0.80% 
3-digit SIC Industry Dummies Included    
Model χ2 (Model p-value)  552.36 (< 0.001)  
Pseudo R2  11.14%   
% correctly classified (% no-impairment in sample) 66.11% (55.79%)  
Actual impairment (actual no-impairment) predicted to be true 52.16% (77.17%)  
Type I (type II) error  22.83% (47.84%)  
Panel B. Tobit regression predicting the amount of impairment vs. no-impairment 
Independent variable 
Coefficient 
estimate t-statistics p-value 
Effect on 
probability
Intercept –0.118 –5.49 < 0.001 ——— 
OVE1   0.119 16.81 < 0.001 16.03% 
OVE2   0.051 3.85 < 0.001 6.82% 
STOCK%   0.001 8.84 < 0.001 0.18% 
Log(NUM)   0.029 2.02    0.022 3.87% 
VALUE –0.017 –1.85    0.032 –2.35% 
FOREIGN%   0.036 2.29    0.011 4.91% 
GOODWILL   0.046 9.92 < 0.001 6.19% 
Log(MV) –0.007 –2.52    0.006 –0.99% 
3-digit SIC Industry Dummies Included    
Model χ2 (Model p-value)  774.16 (< 0.001)  
Pseudo R2  25.08%  
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The definitions of OVE1, OVE2, STOCK%, NUM, VALUE, and MV are as given in the footnote to 
Table 1.  FOREIGN% is the percentage of foreign acquisitions made by the firm in a given year 
and ranges between 0 and 100%.  GOODWILL is the amount of goodwill relative to the firm’s 
total assets.  The dependent variable in the logistic regression of Panel A takes the value of 1 for 
firms reporting impairment in the subsequent year and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable in the 
tobit regression of Panel B takes the value of the actual amount of goodwill impairment relative to 
the firm’s total assets for firms with goodwill impairment in subsequent years and 0 for no-
impairment firms.  The sample for both regressions consists of firms with acquisition activities in 
the year of measuring share overpricing.     
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Table 8 
Mean and Median Firm Performance around Acquisition and Goodwill Write-off 
 
 Years relative to acquisition  Years relative to impairment  From acquisition 
Variable  –1  0  +1    –1  0  +1  +2  +3   through write-off 
Panel A. Firms that survived up to three years after impairment (404 firms)      
Excess stock return 0.0400 0.1211 –0.1197  0.0294 –0.2590 –0.0260 0.0772 –0.0388  –0.3164 
 –0.1249 0.0608 –0.1575  –0.0280 –0.3745 –0.0723 –0.0147 –0.0710  –0.4275 
Return on assets –0.0797 –0.0642 –0.0808  –0.0713 –0.1214 –0.1259 –0.0967 –0.1021   
 0.0041 0.0003 –0.0020  –0.0077 –0.0304 –0.0220 –0.0229 –0.0168  —— 
Panel B. Firms that survived up to only two years after impairment (18 firms)     
Excess stock return 0.4634 2.3665 –0.4839  –0.4412 0.1979 0.4263 –0.3107  –1.0457 
 0.2362 –0.1932 –0.5010  –0.5808 0.0151 0.1132 –0.4215 ——  –0.8942 
Return on assets –0.0401 –0.0636 –0.1348  –0.0555 –0.1352 –0.0928 –0.1336   
 0.0102 –0.0113 –0.0595  –0.0458 –0.0881 –0.0472 –0.0813 ——  —— 
Panel C. Firms that survived up to only one year after impairment (37 firms)     
Excess stock return –0.0911 –0.0666 –0.0363  –0.0317 –0.1411 –0.1293  –1.8873 
 –0.0741 0.0729 –0.1475  –0.0095 –0.1319 –0.1227 —— ——  –2.1263 
Return on assets –0.1047 –0.1000 –0.1829  –0.1809 –0.4252 –0.4638   
 –0.0033 –0.0173 –0.0352  –0.0600 –0.1786 –0.1613 —— ——  —— 
Panel D. Firms that did not survive after impairment (45 firms)       
Excess stock return –0.1245 –0.0327 –0.4565  –0.3764 –0.3651  –1.0049 
 –0.1178 –0.1722 –0.5325  –0.4857 –0.4430 —— —— ——  –0.9954 
Return on assets –2.0452 –0.1493 –0.1664  –0.1850 –0.2789   
 –0.0062 –0.0298 –0.0626  –0.0871 –0.1806 —— —— ——  —— 
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The first (second) row for each variable reports the mean (median) value of that variable.  Sample firms included in this table have 
acquisition activities identified in the SDC database and report goodwill impairment over 2001-2006.  The sample in panel A consists of 
404 firms that report goodwill impairment over 2001-2003 and have the required Compustat data available for up to three years after the 
impairment.  The sample in panel B consists of 18 firms that report goodwill impairment over 2001-2003 but no longer have the required 
Compustat data available in two years after the impairment.  The sample in panel C consists of 37 firms that report goodwill impairment 
over 2001-2004 but no longer have the required Compustat data available in one year after the impairment.  The sample in panel D 
consists of 45 firms that report goodwill impairment over 2001-2005 but no longer have the required Compustat data available after the 
impairment year.    
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Table 9 
Summary Statistics from the Regression of Market Reaction to Goodwill Write-offs in Quarterly Earnings Announcement on 
Unexpected Earnings and the Reported Amount of Goodwill Write-off 
 
 Stock price reaction to   Analyst forecast revision 
 quarterly earnings news  One-quarter ahead  Two-quarter ahead  Three-quarter ahead 
  Variable Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 
   Intercept –0.006 0.005  –0.004 –0.002  –0.004 –0.003  –0.003 –0.002 
   (t-statistics) (–0.64) (0.60) (–3.74) (–2.58) (–4.09) (–2.85) (–2.94) (–1.76)
   [p-value] [0.260] [0.275]  [< 0.001] [0.005]  [< 0.001] [0.003]  [0.002] [0.040] 
   UXE 0.214 0.170  0.036 0.028  0.049 0.042  0.048 0.041 
 (3.04) (2.34) (3.70) (2.79) (3.60) (3.00) (2.92) (2.52)
 [0.001] [0.009] [< 0.001] [0.002] [< 0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.006]
   WOF ——— –0.094  ——— –0.008  ——— –0.007  ——— –0.006 
  (–3.15) (–3.14)  (–2.63) (–2.39)
  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.004] [0.009]
   YR02 –0.009 –0.007  –0.001 –0.001  –0.001 –0.001  –0.001 –0.001 
 (–0.85) (–0.61) (–1.08) (–0.89) (–0.81) (–0.62) (–0.54) (–0.39)
 [0.197] [0.273] [0.141] [0.187] [0.208] [0.266] [0.294] [0.350]
   YR03 –0.004 –0.008  0.001 0.001  0.002 0.001  0.001 0.001 
 (–0.34) (–0.79) (0.83) (0.15) (1.88) (1.24) (1.01) (0.47)
 [0.366] [0.215]  [0.203] [0.441]  [0.030] [0.109]  [0.155] [0.319] 
   YR04 –0.005 –0.011  0.002 0.001  0.002 0.001  0.001 0.001 
 (–0.48) (–1.08) (1.47) (0.72) (1.86) (1.23) (1.18) (0.66)
 [0.317] [0.140] [0.072] [0.237] [0.032] [0.109] [0.119] [0.255]
   YR05 –0.006 –0.009  0.002 0.001  0.003 0.002  0.002 0.001 
 (–0.57) (–0.99) (1.73) (1.21) (2.42) (1.86) (1.77) (1.27)
 [0.283] [0.161] [0.042] [0.113] [0.008] [0.031] [0.039] [0.102]
   Adj. R2 2.35% 3.95%  5.92% 8.55%  9.36% 11.68%  7.72% 9.40% 
   F-statistics 6.22 8.43  14.97 18.30  20.99 22.35  16.46 16.98 
   [p-value] [< 0.0001] [< 0.0001]  [< 0.0001] [< 0.0001]  [< 0.0001] [< 0.0001]  [< 0.0001] [< 0.0001] 
   N 1,085 1,085  1,112 1,112  969 969  925 925 
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In Models 1 and 2, we regress the firm’s market-adjusted returns over a five-day window, event day –2 to event day +2, defined 
in relation to the date of quarterly earnings and impairment announcement, on unexpected earnings (UXE) and the reported 
absolute amount of goodwill write-offs (WOF).  Unexpected earnings are defined as the difference between actual earnings and 
analyst consensus forecast immediately before the earnings announcement.  UXE and WOF are deflated by the firm’s market 
value on the date of analyst forecast.  In Models 3–8, we regress the revision of analyst earnings forecast made after the write-off 
announcement on UXE and WOF.  Following Petersen (2006), we run all regressions with year dummies included and report the 
significance level of coefficient estimate obtained from firm level clustering.   
 
Figure 2 
Changes in Economic Activities Around Goodwill Impairment Write-off 
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Figure 3 
Changes in Business Segment Around Goodwill Impairment Write-off 
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